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“Political Economy or Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life;
it examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with
the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing.
Thus it is on the one side a study of wealth; and on the other, and more important side,
a part of the study of man. For man’s character has been moulded by his every-day work,
and the material resources which he thereby procures, more than by any other influence
unless it be that of his religious ideals.”
Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 1920
Abstract
Economic processes, consisting of interactions between human be-
ings, exploit the social capital of persons endowed with specific culture
and identities. The role of institutions and policy makers is to build
positive social capital and exploit it to reach their objectives. How-
ever, social capital is elusive and has several dimensions by which to
interpret its multifaceted functions in economics and society. We can-
not forget, furthermore, that social capital sometimes is undesirable
for society, for instance when used for unethical uses. Even so, it is
widely accepted that social capital has stable and positive effects.
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1 Introduction
Wellbeing is pursued through individual and social action. The social dimen-
sion is therefore a decisive economic force. Social capital, contributing to the
cumulative capacity of individuals and social groups to work together for a
common goal, is however often overlooked by economic theory. Neoclassical
economics models are sometimes too harsh in depicting human behaviours,
choices and dynamics. This usually results, at best, in useless economic the-
ories and, at worst, in wrong policy prescriptions and forecasts. A feeling of
incongruity may arise from the application to the human behaviour of the
homo oeconomicus’ logic. Indeed, economic processes consist of interactions
between human beings. These processes exploit the social capital of persons
endowed with specific identities.
Social capital evolves during long periods, or better it co-evolves with
all the economic institutions and organizations in which it is embedded.
Social capital is not always positive, but usually it can solve and reduce
both government and market failures. This is why the policy maker should
be aware of the social capital’s existence and the constraints it imposes on
the changes and challenges a society can face. The role of the policy maker is
to build positive social capital and exploit it to reach her objectives. Human
capital investment and a correct education strategy are two viable tools that
complement and magnify the social capital’s effect on the economy.
To correctly address the relations among social capital, institutions and
policy making, it is important to stress that, notwithstanding it can be
enhanced, social capital is also highly elusive. On the one hand, even that
social capital should be used by institutions to achieve their goals, it cannot
be disposed as it were physical capital. On the other hand, even that social
capital is out of control and not easy to influence by politicians, it can be
raised in the long run by farsighted policies.
In the next sections, we explore social capital dimensions and we consider
the intertwinements of social capital, institutions and organizations. A role
for social capital in theorizing is then investigated. In the second part of the
paper, we introduce social capital among the constraints and aims of the
policy maker. The active consideration of social capital as a policy resource
gives advice on the proper course of action to reach the policy maker’s
objectives, among which we stress education as co-objective to pursue.
2 Social capital dimensions
Given its multidimensionality, social capital can be defined in many ways.
Therefore, since this work does not want to skip any fundamental interpre-
tation about social capital, a clear and precise definition of social capital
lacks all along this study. It is interesting, however, to circumscribe at best
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this concept starting from its characteristic dimensions.
Social capital has different dimensions by which to interpret its multi-
faceted functions in economics and society. The structural domain of social
capital is important to understand organizations, institutions and leader-
ship shaping the structure of social relations. Also the bonding/bridging
structure of social capital relates to this dimension. The relational aspect of
social capital pertains to trust, norms and identity. This dimension of social
capital stresses that relational ties are inimitable. Indeed, ethnic commu-
nities are socially complex and have strictly idiosyncratic characteristics.
Another dimension of social capital is the cognitive domain that involves
mental processes, concepts and ideas. Social groups have seated and shared
mental processes embedded in their language, stories and culture. The re-
sulting articulated value system, strictly related to religious principles, has a
profound impact on economic development [Weber, 1930, Guiso et al., 2003].
Social capital concerns, for instance, tangible and virtual resources which
are collected by parties through social structure and which promote their
achievements of goals. The set of resources relevant for social capital are
those embedded in relationships. Other concepts often paired to social capi-
tal are trust and norms. These concepts are self-reinforcing and cumulative,
in the sense that there is a self-sustained process of accumulation of all
the resources. Social capital can be built in childhood, without sacrifice
and calculation, and also in an optimizing framework as individual decision
making process, with conscious calculation taking in account opportunity
costs [Rupasingha et al., 2006].
A fundamental dimension of social capital is trust. Trust, a lubricant of
the social system [Arrow, 1974], can be defined as the willingness to permit
the decisions of others to influence our welfare [Sobel, 2002]. Notwithstand-
ing its importance in the composition of social capital, trust is different
from social capital particularly at the individual level [Glaeser et al., 2002].
Trusting other individuals brings positive externalities to them, therefore,
the level of social capital of individuals prone to trust others a lot can be less
if they are not targeted of trust at the same level. Trust can be in compe-
tence and in intentions [Nooteboom, 2007]. Others can have good intensions
towards us but not the competence to help us effectively. On the other hand,
others can have the competence and the instruments to affect positively our
conditions but lacking the intentions to do it. Trust can change and be
raised in different ways, not always idyllic. For instance, in a situation in
which individuals have different opinions and diverge on the proper course
of events, if trouble is solved by voice and not exit, trust tends to deepen.
Trust is also in a significant relation to control. Usually, we think about sub-
stitutes between trust and control, meaning that once trust is built control is
not necessary anymore. However, some form of control can also complement
trust activating a self-reinforcement of these behaviours [Nooteboom, 2007].
Two types of social capital are commonly differentiated [Burt, 1982,
3
Coleman, 1988, Putnam, 2000]. First, bonding social capital refers to ties
internal to the social group, ties that are stronger and common in denser
networks. Second, bridging social capital refers to external ties, ties that
are weaker and are common in larger networks. The former kind of social
capital is not always to be preferred to the latter. Too much bonding social
capital stifles innovation and adaptation, generates monopolies, collusion
and cartels. In addition, weaker ties leading to larger networks are better
to share more information than stronger ties of denser networks having a
higher degree of overlapping information. The differentiation of these two
types of ties is a useful tool also in the field of theory of the firm. In order
to develop a well-functioning firm, entrepreneurs should maintain a dual
network of both weak ties and strong ties. With a right balance of ties,
employees and other actors share common goals and maximize information
diffusion.
Many kinds of capital have to evolve to guarantee a proper development
of a community. In addition to physical capital, all the forms of capital
have usually a positive relation with social capital and they are accessed
through it. Community membership gives access to pooled resources, but
usually high quality ties are necessary. Also human capital in a community is
accessed by its participants in a preferential way. Ethnic or cultural capital is
a resource formed by language, accent, manner and religion rituals. Usually
it is positive but there are also cases in which cultural capital has negative
influence. For instance, cultural capital can be an obstacle in the process by
which social capital is converted to economic wealth when it is not supportive
to entrepreneurship [Light and Dana, 2013].
Identity capital or motivational capital is another important form of cap-
ital. From identity comes a sense of belonging. When individuals experience
an identity, they feel emotionally and cognitively tied to their organization.
Identity is important in economics because it can solve the problem of in-
complete contracts whenever effort is hard to observe or to reward [Akerlof
and Kranton, 2005]. There is also a substitutability to take into account be-
tween monitoring, to achieve completeness of information, and identity, to
exert effort by intrinsic values. Indeed, since monetary incentives (extrinsic
motives) crowd out identity, they are substitutes. Economists’ language is
the language of incentives: we offer something valuable, in order to influence
and change the choice of the subject. However, as Grant [2002] states, an
incentive scheme hides always a relation of power. Finally, also identity is
not always positive and can pose problems. Some problems arise, for in-
stance, because identity can be experienced with the working group and not
with the organization as a whole.
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2.1 Institutions matter
In the economy, the same stimulation does not always produce the same
effect. In social contexts, institutions affect and modify the outcome of a
policy, and more in general a behaviour. Institutions substitute and com-
plement social capital, they co-evolve with social capital [Aoki, 2007] in a
positive but also negative way. Whenever agents recognize fair institutions,
they stimulate positive conformations of social capital.1 Trust and good in-
stitutions self-reinforce themselves. In addition to understanding such intri-
cate feedback-type interconnections existing in a given period, policy makers
should consider their evolutionary dynamics. Indeed, institutions are the re-
sult of a historical process; they are, together with social capital, the legacy
of history. Social capital is usually paired to the concept of informal insti-
tutions. Douglass C. North, in his Nobel lecture, defined institutions as a
combination “of formal constraints (e.g. rules, laws, constitutions), infor-
mal constraints (e.g. norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed codes
of conduct) and their enforcement characteristics”.
Impersonal exchanges of contemporary industrial economies are char-
acterized by several players, with little information about other parties in
transactions and with strategic interactions or games often not repeated or
with a precise end. These conditions do not allow cooperation to be sus-
tained. On the contrary, in small-scale societies with personalized exchange,
cooperation is pursued more times than competition. The creation of effec-
tive economic and political institutions in contemporary economies could
involve the alteration of the benefit-cost ratios in favor of cooperative so-
lutions. If this is the case, the predetermination of an institutional setting
cannot be omitted in analytical models.
Many holists acquiesce that only individuals, not institutions, can be
agents of change, while most individualists endorse that society profoundly
affects the individual. Douglass C. North, during the 1980s, explored long-
run institutional change. Separating institutions from organizations, he de-
fined the former as the rules of the game and the latter as the players.
Groups of individuals with the same objective function compose organiza-
tions.2 And organizations, while pursuing their objectives, are the agents of
change. Indeed, while pushed by competition, they try to change the insti-
tutional framework to boost their competitive position. The vehemence of
competition will affect the rate of institutional change and the perceptions
of the actors involved will influence the direction of change. Ultimately, the
opportunities resulting from the institutional framework determine the same
existence of the organizations that compete to survive.
1A typical example of the effect of good institutions on social capital is the raise in
entrepreneurship [Percoco, 2012].
2For instance, firms, unions, cooperatives, political parties, regulatory agencies,
churches, sport associations and clubs.
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Individuals create, out of their actions, society. But, to some signifi-
cant extent, the social situation creates the individual. Individuals develop
their habits and routines and accept their social conventions and norms.
If we believe that individuals, acting in their self-interest, unintentionally
give rise to social rules, we would prefer an invisible-hand approach to in-
stitutions rather than a collectivist one. The belief whether spontaneous
institutional developments and changes would be consistent with the eco-
nomic and social system has a deep impact in the position in the debate
on interventionism versus non-interventionism. Nevertheless, economic effi-
ciency and social benefit, that should guide interventionists, are difficult to
define in the context of an evolving institutional system.
2.2 A role for social capital
There are several market and government failures for which social capi-
tal gains relevance and is a useful instrument. Issues like free-riding, public
good, externalities and incomplete information are better solved at the com-
munity level. In labour markets, for instance, information is incomplete and
therefore recruiting often happens from within homogeneous social cate-
gories. Since these same homogeneous social categories spread social norms
and monitor members, employers can obtain loyalty and social control within
employees’ network.
A community is a group of people who interact directly, frequently and
in multi-faceted ways [Bowles and Gintis, 2002]. In communities, there
is strong reciprocity, meaning that people are willing to bear the costs of
punishments to enforce norms and equity [Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000]. Other
relevant experiments dealing with social capital confirm that trust and reci-
procity are basic elements of human behaviour [Berg et al., 1995] and find
that the degree of social connection positively correlates with trustworthi-
ness [Glaeser et al., 2000]. However, there are also community failures like
the necessary small scale and homogeneity that impede diversity. Public
intervention should take into account all these aspects, understanding the
limits of communities but also that the community level can solve public
and market failures.
Communities are social networks, for which embeddedness of economic
actions permits access to external or network resources. The denser a social
network the clearer and more firmly held the norms governing behaviours.
The representation by means of networks is useful also to understand the
kind of links connecting nodes. Whenever two distant part of the network
are connected we speak about bridging. In this case, key individuals deal
with structural holes and sometimes these individuals are entrepreneurs that
generate profit motivated by their position and connections.3 Long lasting
3Social capital differs depending on the number and the kind of links. For the particular
position of entrepreneurs near to structural holes, in which there are by definition no many
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relationships, represented through network participation, are based on reci-
procity. The economic consequences of social networks are many, as, for
instance, when price changes depending on network position, or in other
words social capital [Granovetter, 2005].
Network externalities4 arise in these contexts. If an individual enters a
network, that will bring positive externalities to individuals connected to her
but not yet connected to that network. Externalities can also be negative, as
for all the outsiders of the network whenever the network absorbs common
resources. The link of a network represents a tie, but ties are of different
kind/importance. Granovetter [1973] highlights that the strength of ties in
social networks depends on factors such as investment of time, emotional
involvement, intimacy and reciprocity. Status, social influence that enables
to reward and punish others, is also a form of social capital.
Horizontal networks are better for knowledge sharing. Instead, vertical
networks produce a clear hierarchy among individuals. Hierarchy is often
negatively considered, in particular for issues like knowledge diffusion, trust
and reciprocity. For instance, trust is lower in countries with dominant
hierarchical religions [La Porta et al., 1996]. However, we can think also of
situations in which a clear hierarchy of competent and influential individuals
can have a positive impact on the social capital embedded in an organized
and effective social network.
Because of the limits of man’s abilities to comprehend and compute in
the face of complexity and uncertainty, in other words bounded rationality,
heuristics and suboptimal equilibria arise. Neoclassical instruments are not
able to cope with this kind of problems. On the other hand, individuals’
social capital can improve the economic situation and sustain a “good” equi-
librium. All the situations plagued with coordination failure may improve
with higher levels of social capital. Individuals’ opportunism can be very
detrimental with specific investment. Also in this situation social capital
fits well in dealing with the problem. The same relationships at the base
of social capital are, by definition, specific. Indeed, social capital cannot be
traded like every asset that is entirely specific.
The decision maker, like every actor in the economy, faces informa-
tion and decision-making costs, psychological constraints and existing social
norms. Individuals are often rational in an adaptive sense. If conditions
change or superior alternatives become available, individuals will adapt be-
haviours establishing new satisfactory habits and routines. Social norms,
that specify many of the goals of action, would be accommodated accord-
ingly. Bicchieri [2006] states that social norms motivate action, but only
indirectly. The direct, underlying motives are the beliefs and desires that
links, we could think, contrary to the predominant view, of low social capital for them.
4In presence of network externalities, the more widespread and compatible a good
the higher its value. In this situation, scale economies and problems of lock-in, path
dependence and multiple equilibria emerge.
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support the norm. Indeed, the particular form of bounded rationality that
characterizes individuals depends on the social context in which they live.
Therefore, if we accept that decision making costs and psychological
constraints restrict the role of rational evaluation and promote habits and
rules of thumb, rationality is more a matter of gradual adaption over time
than a matter of instantaneous optimization. In addition, social norms
constrain individual action and shape preferences and goals. Endogeneity of
preferences to social capital [Sobel, 2002] has paramount implications with
respect to assumptions in our models. We can say that social capital changes
what individuals prefer, but also that preferences determine the amount of
social capital accumulation.
We cannot forget, finally, that social capital sometimes is undesirable for
society. The most common problem is for outsiders that undergo negative
effects for the action of insiders.5 But also insiders lose individual freedom
of action because of the rigid enforcement of social norms. Social capital
itself may be used for unethical uses by criminals, terrorists and gangs.
Social capital can protect mediocrities, reduce objectivity, impose mental
conformity and inhibit escape from failing partners.
3 The policy maker
Welfare functions require explicit value judgements and interpersonal com-
parisons make many economists uncomfortable. There is no trivial solution
to the problem of social welfare. We cannot be satisfied with an overopti-
mistic picture of government always acting in the social interest [Putnam
et al., 1994]. However, also the market does not guarantee efficiency, nor it
is free of coercion. The actual markets and governments’ performance has
to be continually supervised, analyzed, and regulated to meet changing eco-
nomic and ethical claims. There is no prior guarantee that the adjustments
actually made or not made are in the best interest of society.
Whenever we agree on a shared set of objectives to pursue through public
action, we ask the policy maker to act in accordance to them in the most effi-
cient and proper way. It is, therefore, conspicuous the urge of defining better
the role of the policy maker. The importance of proper policy intervention
is stressed by economic theory. Whenever cooperation and complementari-
ties are common, multiple equilibria exist, some of which with low levels of
social capital.
Social contracts are valuable since they affect productivity of individuals
and organizations. Social connections yield rules of conduct. When social
networks are associated to reciprocity norms, social capital is formed because
5For the same reason, bilateral agreements in trade can be detrimental to the commu-
nity of countries, since outsiders lose market shares. Therefore, multilateral agreements
are preferred to bilateral agreements in order to develop a common market.
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the reciprocal obligations lessen the incentives for deceitful and opportunis-
tic behaviour. Transaction costs are, indeed, low in instances of mutual trust
[Fukuyama, 1995]. As Putnam [2000] points out “a society characterized by
generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society, for the
same reason that money is more efficient than barter”. Civil commitment
and social capital, implying reciprocal obligation and responsibility for ac-
tion, are particularly important regarding productivity for complex tasks,
since tacit knowledge, informal rules and cooperation are pervasive wherever
these tasks are performed.
Bernheim and Bagwell [1988] take into consideration the effects of pub-
lic policies in relation to social capital. Family linkages produce complex
networks, and individuals pertaining to families belong to many dynastic
groupings. Therefore, equity issues of public policies are strongly affected
by the presence of side transfers all along these complex networks. Many
neutrality results, like irrelevance of public redistributions, distortionary
taxes and prices, are implied by the complex proliferation of linkages be-
tween families. All policy-related results based on the dynastic framework,
including the Ricardian equivalence, are affected by the actual structure of
family linkages.
Policy makers, as with all the forms of capital, should try to enforce a
policy supportive to social capital formation, and also try to exploit social
capital in order to achieve their goals. Many works on social capital take
it as given and fixed in its amount. However, social capital can change in
the long run. Its evolution is slow because social capital is based on norms,
on views as to how people should behave that depend upon the particular
situation.
Social capital is, therefore, indispensable in the policy maker’s actions.
No economic policy that wants to succeed in a specific territory can forget
the amount and quality of social capital embedded in its population. On
top of that, social capital should be exploited in a smart way to sustain and
facilitate the policy maker’s objectives.
3.1 Social capital as a policy resource
Among the many definitions of social capital, the World Bank’s definition is
that of enduring social relationships of trust and reciprocity that enhance a
group’s capacity to coordinate actions of its members as they work toward
a collective good. Since the aim of economic policy is exactly to coordinate
better the actions of individuals toward a collective good, social capital is a
natural policy resource. The positive spillovers of social capital are several.
A culture of trustfulness brings benefits for everybody. Empirical research
shows that trustfulness is positively related to infantile survival, to education
and even to efficiency, to the success of many firms, to GDP growth.
The pursuit of economic growth is a well-established part of the political
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agenda for many countries. However, some concerns about simple economic
growth arise when we focus on the forms of social participation. As a mat-
ter of fact, developed economies undergo a risk of social impoverishment
[Putnam, 2000]. In addition to material needs, individuals have substantial
relational needs. The satisfaction of the latter requires the implication of
other individuals, that is, some form of social participation. Nonetheless,
developed economies have reached a high level of satisfaction with material
needs, while relational needs are sometimes overlooked.
Economic growth increases pressure on disposable time, generating sub-
stitution of time-intensive activities with time-saving activities. Since most
of the activities involving social participation are time-intensive, economic
growth generates an impulse toward private (non-social) activities. As a re-
sult of the shrinking of social participation, a social poverty trap (namely a
Pareto-dominated equilibrium of the economy) can arise [Sacco et al., 2006].
Several factors may contribute to a further decrease in the level of so-
cial participation. Alesina and La Ferrara [2002] identify some factors that
explain low trust levels: recent traumatic experiences, belonging to a dis-
criminated minority, failure in terms of education and income, and mixed
community (racial and/or income level). Therefore, population heterogene-
ity, in terms of income or ethnicity, may act as a deterrent to social inter-
action, as social networks based on homogeneity and shared interests are
reduced or broken. Additionally, the increased mobility levels of the work-
ing population and rising in- and out-migration trends can bring further
momentum to social segmentation. This trend can be observed through the
falling rate of homeownership. Indeed, because of high transaction costs in
the real estate market, low mobility is paired to homeownership.
Montgomery [2000] studies how political leaders may use social capital
originally formed for some purposes to accomplish totally different objec-
tives. Among these objectives, social capital is a potential source of im-
proved voting levels, a multiplicity of active memberships, macro-level im-
provements in public health associated with community activity and micro-
level successes in administering development projects.
Conditional cooperation, experimentally investigated by Fischbacher et al.
[2001], supports the fact that people condition their contribution level to the
contribution of others. Therefore, there is mounting evidence that cooper-
ation is not merely an altruistic act, but can serve selfish purposes as well
[Axelrod, 1984]. People cooperate also because they obtain benefits. For
instance, cooperative people encourage reciprocity from others, have a rep-
utation of dutiful members of society with a virtuous behaviour, develop a
social status and lay claim to leadership. A frequent and sizeable virtuous
cycle of cooperation allows to consider social capital predictable and as a
useful basis for policy initiatives.
Even though family network ties seem to affect individual migration [Pal-
loni et al., 2001], when people choose to emigrate they break a large part
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of their old group ties and affiliations. In such a way, individual behaviours
are less driven by inherited communal obligations and more by personal con-
siderations deriving from market (for example wage levels) and non-market
value preferences (for example culture charm) [Heffron, 2000]. Masses of
migrants change and co-determine in such a way the evolving structure of
human and social capital in a given region. However, there are significant
costs to moving from one community to another. Therefore migration gen-
erates a deep impact on social capital of individuals, affecting, for instance,
their propensity to become entrepreneurs [Wahba and Zenou, 2012].
Social capital is heterogeneous and somewhat volatile as a policy re-
source. Public access to energies enclosed in social capital to policymakers
depends on the kind of social capital. Indeed, the drivers of a fifty-year
period of rapid social and economic development, in addition to the mate-
rialist values such as individualism and achievement, were more traditional
social norms like obedience and religious faith than postmaterialist values of
trust and cooperation one normally associates with social capital [Inglehart,
1997]. In addition, social capital is a neutral resource. If social capital is
accessed, its uses may raise the efficiency of a policy. However, the same
uses strengthen the commitment to the organizations’ values and benefits
that have either positive or negative side effects for the society as a whole.
3.2 Education as a co-objective of the policy maker’s action
The role of the policy maker requires to develop the capital of the nation. In
the past, the main focus was on investment in physical capital, whereas, to-
day, the emphasis has shifted towards investment in human capital. Increas-
ing human capital is of paramount importance to realize well-being. Knowl-
edge disseminated by education positively affects non-market aspects of the
quality of life. Additionally, the externality-type benefits that reach others
are even more important to human welfare than pure economic growth.
Raising human capital, through more educated and healthier popula-
tion, leads to higher productivity that translates into future higher firms’
profits. In knowledge and competence-based economies, people have be-
come extremely important. A more educated population is attained through
better educational facilities6, meaning better physical and immaterial as-
sets. Investment in education should be prioritized by policy makers for
its externality-type benefits on all the population, like reduced crime and
enhanced social cohesion.
Social capital is a peculiar kind of capital also for its ability to be in-
finitely transferred without exhaustion. This characteristic, that it shares
with human capital and knowledge, enables individuals to share something
6There are three parts in installing an educational facility: fabricating a school, oper-
ating a school and building human capital.
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that can be given to others without diminishing its availability to the orig-
inal individuals. Social capital appreciates with use: the more often it is
accessed, the higher its level of utility to individuals. Social capital has a
strong complementarity with other capitals. Social entrepreneurship, bet-
tering the reputation of a region, produces social capital that can be ex-
ploited also by commercial entrepreneurs [Estrin et al., 2013]. Therefore,
a widespread non-for-profit sector and a high level of civil development is
supportive to a broad diffusion of social capital and capital in general.
Education can sustain and yield higher profits and wages, improved
health, lower fertility rates, political stability and freedom, lower poverty
and inequality rates, better environment and lower crime rates. Indeed, ed-
ucation, being critical to the broader process that sustain economic growth,
is the building block of economic development generating non-market re-
turns and externalities that are vital to human welfare.
Social capital accumulation occurs via inter- and intra-generational trans-
mission mechanisms. Individuals acquire good culture mainly from their
parents and update their values intra-generationally through their life con-
tacts. The relevancy of inter-generational networks is attested by many
scholars, as done for example by Magruder [2010] finding that fathers serve
as useful network connections to their sons. However, intra-generational
networks are less investigated.
Schools and social “spaces” where interactions take place are decisive in
creating and shaping social capital. Therefore, spatial segregation should be
responsible for the actual dissemination of trust and beliefs. The life in a
certain neighbourhood usually brings to certain occupations, socio-economic
positions and particularly to shared values. Industrial clusters, being sensi-
tive to incentives not completely encompassed in contracts, witness different
levels and typologies of social capital.
Formal and informal institutions contribute to the construction of social
capital. In addition to their peculiar characteristics, their spatial localization
is a fundamental factor to take in account. Interestingly, Tabellini [2010]
argues that informal institutions may help explaining why even under the
same formal institutions, regional differences may resist the force of history.
4 Concluding remarks
Social capital co-evolves with institutions and individuals. Policy makers,
not obstructed by a reductionist vision of economics populated only by per-
fect rational individuals, have to take into account and also to exploit so-
cial capital. Indeed, policy making has to be fine-tuned with the proper
balance of instruments like market-oriented incentives, public coercion and
social and civil enhanced participation. The interactions among these in-
struments are many and they can puzzle policy makers. Crowding out may
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occur sometimes with more precise property rights, with attempts to induce
higher levels of work efforts, compliance to norms or environmental conser-
vation by fines and sanctions. For such changes, some time may be needed
to interiorize the new norms of conduct.
Human relations support economic growth, sustainable development and
social progress. People exist in a relational contest and have relational needs,
in addition to biological needs. Therefore, increasing efficiency could be
useless if it neglects such needs. But if “no man is an island” [Merton, 2005],
Heffron [2000] notes that, given the recent explosion of voluntary group
activity, no group is an island either. Individuals use their group membership
to access goods and services of other groups of which they are not members.
The amount of social capital within a group is inversely related to the level
of the group’s insulation from the other groups and associations in society.
Nowadays, group ties and affiliations are often individually chosen driven
more by market forces, non-market value preferences and duty to society
and the state than by community obligations.
However, social capital and trust binding members of a group together
can cause hostility against other groups. Durable relationships help keeping
groups together, but they do not necessarily imply trust. Individuals can
take advantage of a possible free ride and relax their own efforts believing
that the others will carry on. Even so, it is widely accepted that social
capital has stable and positive effects.
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